Next, I take up the issue of finding a middle or natural ground between realism and antirealism. The first part of my paper offers a certain classification and critical exposition of realisms in philosophy of science. THE CONTROVERSY OVER RES IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE MYSTERIES OF ONTOLOGICAL NEUTRALITYĬlarification of the terms 'realism' and 'antirealism' has always been a challenging task for philosophers of science, epistemologists, and metaphysicians. I develop a new theory of content, which does not hav. I claim that although this theory involves an important insight, it is an unsatisfactory attempt at reduction of the notion of reference. In this thesis, after a brief introduction to these trials is given, Fodors theory of content in terms of asymmetric dependence is examined in some depth. Naturalistic philosophers of meaning try to define the recalcitrant concept of reference in terms respected by the empirical science, such as causality or teleology. In such a coherent.Īytekin, Tevfik Sayan, Erdinç Department of Philosophy (2003) In this thesis I argue that scientific theories are accepted or rejected on the bases of an evaluation of their degree of coherence. Nevertheless, empirical adequacy remained as having a privileged value among these virtues. That theories should possess other virtues in order to be accepted by the scientific community is well understood. Philosophers of science have long realized that it is not possible to decide which scientific theory is true just by relying on their empirical adequacy. Kamözüt, Mehmet Cem Sayan, Erdinç Department of Philosophy (2008) This study attempts to reformulate the deflationary thesis by (1) proposing a simple but illuminative typology of deflationisms, (2) detecting the correc.Ī coherentist approach to the justification of scientific theories Deflationism comes in several main varieties, each focusing on a particular aspect/appearance of this negative fact, hence formulating the deflationary thesis under the guidance of that aspect/appearance. By means of various test cases (in terms of rival theories) from history of chemistry, psychology, environmental science, legal reasoning, physiology, geology, astronomy, I put forward results to think that coherence as a heuristic function for truth in the long run, instead of being a theory of truth, is better suited for establishing a connection between coherence and truth, that is, coherence as a heuristic for truth functions as a device for discovering truth, i.e., securing convergence to truth rather than seeking the absolute truth in the presence of the underconsideration problem.ĭeflationism about truth and the general form of sentenceīesler, Arman Grünberg, David Department of Philosophy (2015)ĭeflationism about truth is roughly the negative thesis that truth is not a substantial notion, and does not call for a reductive philosophical analysis. With this way of formalising coherence of belief systems, it also became possible to deal with the problem of isolation objection via the ability to incorporate the cognitively spontaneous beliefs into the framework. In this sense, is it necessary to accept a coherence theory of truth in order to establish that coherence is truth-conducive? Or can this conduciveness be established in another way? To answer these questions, I first attempted to solve the major problem of coherence, namely vagueness, by transforming Bonjour’s criterion-based notion of coherence into a computational account of coherence by devising graph-theoretic framework along with quantitative coherence measures. Coherence as a theory of truth claims that truth can be defined as coherence, i.e., a belief is true if and only if it coheres with other beliefs, no matter these beliefs are isolated from the mind-independent external world.
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